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sonally before trial. Clearly this supposition is valid were there an
absolute privilege to discharge counsel for purposes of substituting an-
other. Such a privilege might easily be abused and continuances and
mistrials made necessary in order not to violate the highly-regarded right
to effective counsel."° But it is less clear that discharge of one's attorney
in order to defend personally would necessarily yield the same result
because this right, unencumbered by the constitutional policy attaching
to the right to counsel, might be conditioned precisely to that extent rather
than disallowed altogether.71 Should the defendant's attempt to defend
personally prove confusing to the jury, the defendant, not the prosecution,
likely would be prejudiced. When the court is confronted with an unruly
and contemptuous defendant, the contempt power, judiciously exercised,
should prove a sufficient tool for preserving order and decorum.
One thing for certain can be said about the "absolute-discretionary"
dichotomy. As currently enunciated, it imparts to the right to defend
pro se an evanescent quality not entirely consistent with the actual and
alleged constitutional underpinnings of the right, nor with notions of in-
dividual autonomy.
RICHrAD A. LEIPPE
Evidence-Admissibility of Computer Business Records As an
Exception to the Hearsay Rule
Modem businesses have begun increasingly to rely on the electronic
digital computer1 as in integral part of their regular operations. 2 Com-
puters are used to make numerical calculations, to store and process
information on business transactions, to keep personnel records, to per-
form various accounting tasks, and to summarize many types of informa-
tion needed for management decisions-in short, they are admirable
receptacles for all types of traditional business records.
'o United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943).
7'Id. at 1011-12 (dissenting opinion). Cf. United States v. Abbamonte, 348
F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1965); Relerford v. United States, 309 F.2d 706 (9th Cir.
1962); United States v. Arlen, 252 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v.
Paccione, 224 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1955).
'For a general discussion of the admission of computer business records into
evidence, see Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1377 (1967). The admission of ordinary business
records into evidence is dealt with in Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 773 (1952).
'Freed, Computer Print-Outs as Evidence, in 16 Am. JuR. PROOF OF FACTS § 1,
at 274 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Freed].
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Inevitably, printed-out business records are offered as evidence in
litigation. A recent example is King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance
Corp.' King, a notary public, was sued for damages because of his false
notarial certificate of acknowledgment to a deed of trust.4 To establish
damages, the plaintiff corporation had to prove the balance due on certain
conditional sales contracts and a note. This proof was made by intro-
ducing both the original contracts and computer print-outs showing the
payments made and the balance due on the contracts and the note. The
original records of payments were made in the branch offices of the
plaintiff and then forwarded to the home office where the information
was fed into a computer.5 The court found that the computer records
were "originals" sufficient to satisfy the best evidence rule even though
the real "original" records of the transactions were available in the
branch offices.' The court, without benefit of a statute on the subject,
admitted the computer records as business records:
In sum, we hold that print-out sheets of business records stored on
electronic computing equipment are admissible in evidence if relevant
and material, without the necessity of identifying, locating, and pro-
ducing as witnesses the individuals who made the entries in the
regular course of business if it is shown (1) that the electronic
computing equipment is recognized as standard equipment, (2) the
entries are made in the regular course of business at or reasonably
near the time of the happening of the event recorded, and (3) the
foundation testimony satisfies the court that the sources of information,
method and time of preparation were such as to indicate its trust-
worthiness and justify its admission.7
The leading case admitting computer business records into evidence
is Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib," in which plaintiff insurer used a
computer to calculate premiums due on an insurance contract made with
the defendant. The formula used for fixing the premiums was contained
in the contract between the parties; one component of the formula con-
sidered claims made by the defendant for earlier losses. Plaintiff proved
the amount of these prior claims by computer records printed out
especially for the litigation. Defendant argued that the original claim





- 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965).
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files and reports should have been produced. The court held the com-
puter evidence was properly admitted since the reports had been made
to plaintiff and fed into the computer in the regular course of business.,
The decision is sound: there is no reason to compel production of the
original claim files unless defendant proposed to prove the inaccuracy of
a particular loss figure, in which case he could produce his own records
on the claim.
Computer records such as those in King and Transport, if offered
to prove the truth of the statements contained therein, are hearsay'0
because they are extra-judicial assertions whose reliability cannot be
checked by cross-examination. The primary reason for the hearsay rule
is to exclude evidence of the assertions of an absent declarant, whose
perceptive skill, memory, and sincerity are not subject to cross-examina-
tion. Of course, a business record cannot be cross-examined, but it is
admissible without that imagined safeguard because of a presumed in-
herent trustworthiness due to internal business reliance on its accuracy."
The common-law exceptions to the hearsay rule for the admission of
business records was quite narrow ;12 it is unlikely that most of today's
computer records would qualify. But most states, faced with contemporary
commercial reality, desired to amplify statutorily the miserly common-law
exception; businessmen needed a reasonable means of proving debts owed
them."" Several "uniform" codfiications evolved. In 1927, the Model
Act for Proof of Business Transactions was proposed;14 it has been
0Id. at 259, 132 N.W.2d at 875." See Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 259, 132 N.W.2d 871, 875
(1965). See also the definition of hearsay in the PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE
FOR THE UNITED STATES DisRicT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES rule 8-01 (c), at 159
(Prelim. Draft March 1969).
" The real guarantee stems from the nature of business operations themselves:
Modern business and professional activities have become so complex, in-
volving so many persons, each performing a different function, that an
accurate daily record of each transaction is required in order to prevent
utter confusion. An inaccurate and false record would be worse than no
record at all.
Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 35, 125 S.E.2d 326, 329
(1962).
" For a discussion of common-law rules and exceptions, see 5 J. WGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 1517-1519, at 347-61 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
"' The business-record exception to the hearsay rule is a manifestation of judicial
conformity to sound business practice. Cf. Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb.
253, 259, 132 N.W.2d 871, 875 (1965). Thus, the guarantee of trustworthiness
may not be the only reason for the exception.
"' 5 WIGMORE § 1520, at 362 (footnote omitted). The Commonwealth Fund sub-
sidized a committee to draft the Model Act, and its report is contained in Morgan,
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adopted by Congress and the legislatures of several states." In 1933, the
Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act emerged;1 it has been
adopted in several states.' Besides the Model Act and the Uniform Act,
the admissibility of business records has been provided for in the Model
Code of Evidence,' the Uniform Rules of Evidence,' 9 and the proposed
federal rules of evidence.2°
The Model Act and the Uniform Act have produced the same
standards of admissibility for both computer and conventional busi-
ness records.21 Computer records, just as other business records, must
The Law of Evidence: Some Proposals for Reform (1927). Green, The Model
and Uniform Statutes Relating to Business Entries as Evidence, 31 TuL. L. REV.
49 n.9 (1956).
Ir 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1964) is the federal statute. Connecticut, Georgia, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode
Island have passed statutes based on the Model Act. Green, The Model and Uni-
from Statutes Relating to Business Entries as Evidence, 31 TUL. L. REV. 49 n.9
(1956). The text of the Model Act provides:
Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or other-
wise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence
or event shall be admissible in evidence in proof of said act, transaction,
occurrence, or event, if the trial judge shall find that it was made in the
regular course of any business, and that it was the regular course of such
business to make such memorandum or record at the time of such act,
transaction, occurrence or event or within a reasonable time thereafter. All
other circumstances of the making of such writing or record, including lack
of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its
weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility....
Reprinted in 5 WIGmORE § 1520, at 362.
The Uniform Act reads in part as follows:
A record of an act, condition or event shall, in so far as relevant, be
competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its
identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular
course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if
in the opinion of the Court, the sources of information, method and time of
preparation were such as to justify its admission.
Reprinted in 5 WIGMORE § 1520, at 363.
"7 California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont,
Washington, and Wyoming have passed the Uniform Act. Misc. Acts, 9 UNIFORM
AcTs ANNOT. 506 (1951). See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4310 (1953); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:82-34 to -40 (1952); WAstH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5.45.010-.920.
(1963).
'- MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 514 (1942).
'9 UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 63(13).
"oPROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
AND MAGISTRATES rule 8-03(b) (6) (Prelim. Draft March 1969).
" North Carolina is one of the states that has adopted neither the Model nor the
Uniform Act. A law review writer recommended that North Carolina adopt the
Model Act in Proposals for Legislation in North Carolina, 9 N.C.L. REV. 1, 47
(1930). However, by judicial decision North Carolina appears to have accom-
[Vol. 48
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meet the basic requirements of the act in question. The record must
be made in the regular course of business at or near the time of the act
or transaction recorded, or within a reasonable time thereafter.2" The
Uniform Act specifies further that the custodian of the record, or some
other qualified witness, must testify as to its identity and mode of
preparation and that the circumstances must justify to the court its
admission.2 3 The regular course of business must require the making of
such records even though the record sought to be admitted was, in fact,
made in the regular course of business.2 Some jurisdictions may require
satisfaction of the best evidence rule, but at least one federal court of
appeals has eliminated any such requirement in applying the federal busi-
ness records statute.2 5 In New York the best evidence rule is satisfied
by non-original records if the originals were destroyed in the usual course
of business.2"
A record may be denied admissibility because of a lack of assurance
that sources of information for it are accurate. The source may have had
plished virtually the same result as the Model and Uniform Acts. See Sims v.
Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962); Smith
Builders Supply, Inc. v. Dixon, 246 N.C. 136, 97 S.E.2d 767 (1957) ; Dairy & Ice
Cream Supply Co. v. Gastonia Ice Cream Co., 232 N.C. 684, 61 S.E.2d 895 (1950).
D. STANSBURY, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAw OF EVIDENCE § 155, at 390 (2d ed.
1963) states:
It is no longer necessary that the person making the entries be dead, or even
that he be identifiable, and he need not have had personal knowledge of the
transaction entered. If the entries were made in the regular course of busi-
ness, at or near the time of the transaction involved, and are authenticated
by a witness who is familiar with the system under which they were made,,
they are admissible.
(Footnote omitted.)
North Carolina has adopted the UNIFoRm PHaOTOGRAPrIC COPIES OF BUSInESs.
AND PUBLIC RECORDS AS EVIDENCE ACT. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-45.1 to -45.4
(1953). See State v. Shumaker, 251 N.C. 678, 111 S.E.2d 878 (1960).
"2See the text of the Model and Uniform Acts, notes 15 & 16 supra.
2'5 WIGMOR § 1520, at 363. See Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb.
253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965).
" Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) ; Comment, Computer Print-Outs
of Business Records and their Admissibility in New York, 31 ALBANY L. REv.
61, 63-64 (1967). See also Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930).
2 United States v. Kimmel, 274 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1960). The proposed federal
rules of evidence would confer the status of an original record upon any computer
print-out. PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES rule 10-01(c), Comment (Prelim. Draft March 1969).
" Comment, Computer Print-Outs of Business Records and their Admissibility
in New York, supra note 24 at 70 (footnote omitted) (original emphasis deleted).
"' Cf. Owens v. City of Seattle, 49 Wash. 2d 187, 194, 299 P.2d 560, 564 (1956).
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to make subjective and now unknown judgments about objective data. In
such a situation the business record is inadmissible without his testimony.2"
A business record may also be excluded from evidence because sources of
information are insufficient to make a reliable record."0 The business rec-
ord may be denied admissibility because the information therein was hap-
hazardly collected from random sources whose reliability is difficult to
evaluate.3" But the lack of a motive by any of the sources to falsify may
justify admissibility. 1
Although a series of business records may not be complete enough
to prove the non-occurrence of a certain event,3 2 when considered to-
gether, they may be complete enough to prove a positive fact. 8 A record
such as that in King would, for example, be complete enough to prove both
the absence of a particular payment and that certain other payments were
made.
Business records will not normally be excluded for the reason that
they are "self-serving."3 Indeed, their presumed trustworthiness is based
on the self-interest of the businessman in the systematic and accurate com-
pilation of his record.35 A more worthy inquiry is whether the preparation
of the record was "inner-directed" or "outer-directed"; that is, whether
the nature of it is such that the business must rely on its accuracy in its
daily transactions."0
The record must, of course, be relevant to an issue involved in the
' Cf. Hartzog v. United States, 217 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1954).
" Allen v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 365 Mo. 677, 681 n.1, 285 S.W.2d 663, 666
n.1 (1956); Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 161, 136 S.E.2d 617, 622 (1964)." United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 869 (2d Cir. 1948).
" Freedman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 342 Pa. 404, 21 A.2d 81 (1941); cf.
Woodward v. United States, 185 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1950), aff'g 88 F. Supp. 152
(S.D. Mo. 1949). But cf. Taylor v. B. Heller & Co., 364 F.2d 608 (6th Cir.
1966).
" Bowman v. Kaufman, 387 F.2d 582, 587-88 (2d Cir. 1967).
"See Doyle v. Chief Oil Co., 64 Cal. App. 2d 284, 292, 148 P.2d 915, 919
(Dist. Ct App. 1944). In some cases, incompleteness of the record may go to
weight rather than to admissibility. United States v. Kimmel, 274 F.2d 54, 57 (2d
Cir. 1960).
"'New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 306 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; Owens
v. City of Seattle, 49 Wash. 2d 187, 190, 299 P.2d 560, 564 (1956). But con-
ceivably there are cases in which such an objection might legitimately be raised.
See, e.g., Douglas Creditors Ass'n v. Padelford, 181 Ore. 345, 182 P.2d 390 (1947).
"See Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio 416, 425-26, 72 N.E.2d 245, 250 (1947).
"' As the size of a business increases, the necessity of an accurate record for
internal reliance increases. But the possibility of error also increases if the record
is the product of several human sources. Of course, it only takes one person who
is careless or of bad motive to make an inaccurate entry, and the likelihood of his
doing so unnoticed increases as the size of the business increases.
[Vol. 48
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litigation. 7 Even if the business record is admissible, parts of it may
not be3s because they contain information that is not trustworthy, such
as unsubstantiated subjective opinions.39 There may also be reason to
suspect the trustworthiness of records when they deal with loans or pay-
ments of money4° or when the first entry on a balance sheet is a state-
ment of money owed with no itemization or other indication of the origin
of the stated figure.
41
Even if the business record otherwise qualifies under the Uniform
or Model Act, the trial court must still determine whether the record
appears accurate and trustworthy.4 In making this determination, the
court should insist on some underlying guarantee in the record-making
process that the data is trustworthy.43
Occasionally, the party against whom a business or computer record
is offered may be estopped by his conduct to object to its admission,
or he may be deemed to have admitted the truth of its contents by his
silence in an out-of-court situation. In State v. Veres44 the defendant was
charged with passing checks while having insufficient funds to cover them.
The trial court over the defendant's objection admitted bank records that
were inadequately qualified because the qualifying witness testified that he
was not familiar with the mechanical operation of the automatic machine
817 Hancock v. Crouch, 267 S.W.2d 36, 40-41 (Mo. App. 1954); Freedman
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 342 Pa. 404, 414, 21 A.2d 81, 86 (1941). See also
Ostrov v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 260 F. Supp. 152, 168 (E.D. Pa. 1966),
vacated on other grounds, 379 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1967).
M aggi v. Mendillo, 147 Conn. 663, 667, 165 A.2d 603, 605 (1960).
o See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 299-303 (D.C. Cir.
1944). But see Allen v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 365 Mo. 677, 681-83, 285 S.W.2d
663, 666-67 (1956).
"' The reason is that the payee has it within his power to take a note or receipt
for the money as independent evidence of the transaction. Douglas Creditors Ass'n
v. Padelford, 181 Ore. 345, 357, 182 P.2d 390, 396 (1947). However, under
modem business statutes it now appears that evidence of loans or payments of
money are usually admissible just as any other business entry. Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d
284 (1967). See Olson v. McLean, 132 Mont. 111, 313 P.2d 1039 (1957); Mahoney
v. Minsky, 39 N.J. 208, 188 A.2d 161 (1963).
" This problem was presented in Merrick v. United States Rubber Co., 7 Ariz.
App. 433, 440 P.2d 314 (1968), in which the court held that the stated unproven
balance and subsequent transactions must constitute separate counts and could not
be joined in the same action. At first blush this holding may seem unrealistic, but
it has the merit of providing protection for the businessman while encouraging the
jury to evaluate separately the proof of each count. But cf. Thompson v. Machado,
78 Cal. App. 2d 870, 178 P.2d 838 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
' Bowman v. Kaufman, 387 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1967).
" See United States v. Grow, 394 F.2d 182, 205 (4th Cir. 1968) ; Hartzog v.
United States, 217 F.2d 706, 710 (4th Cir. 1954).
"7 Ariz. App. 117, 436 P.2d 629 (1968).
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making the records.45 On appeal, admission of the evidence was upheld
on the ground that the defendant had testified both that his bank account
was not in good condition and that at the time of the writing of the
checks he had requested that they not be negotiated. 4 This holding is
unsound. The state had the burden of proof and should have had to
qualify the record regardless of the defendant's testimony.
In Thompson v. Machado,47 a suit on an open-book account, plaintiff-
businessman had repeatedly mailed to the defendant monthly statements
of an amount due. The plaintiff's original business records had been
detroyed in a fire, and the trial court admitted "secondary" records. 48
The appellate court affirmed, saying that the defendant could not deny the
truth of the amount due because he could not prove that he had pro-
tested the accuracy of the monthly statements after he received them.4
The application of estoppel or admission by silence is more justifiable in
this case: the defendant's objections were more properly directed to the
weight to be given the "secondary" records, not to their admissibility.
Computer print-outs as business records lead to unique evidentiary
problems. Qualification of computer records is one. The witness qualify-
ing computer records should have a substantial knowledge of the equip-
ment used and the ability to explain its operation in detail.50 He should
testify as to the procedure of the business5 in using the equipment and
explain just how the record in question was made. Any deviation from
the usual practice of the business in making the record should be dis-
closed. In particular, a witness should describe any procedures-com-
puter or human-used to check for error in the record-making process. 2
The opponent of the evidence's introduction may attack the equip-
ment or "hardware" and show, if possible, that it is unreliable. This
attack may be accomplished by testimony regarding the malfunctions of
the specific machine that made the record or the general unreliability
"Id. at--, 436 P.2d at 637.
"Id. at -, 436 P.2d at 638.
,778 Cal. App. 2d 870, 178 P.2d 838 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
"Id. at -, 178 P.2d at 841.
9Id.
o But business records have been qualified even though the witness admitted a
lack of familiarity with the electronic equipment. Merrick v. United States Rubber
Co., 7 Ariz. App. 433, -, 440 P.2d 314, 316 (1968).
1The procedures of the business at the time the record was made are the
ones to which testimony ought to be directed. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Auto Super-
markets, Inc., 383 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
"' Comment, Compieter Print-Outs of Business Records and their Admissibility
in New York, supra note 24 at 71.
[Vol. 48
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of that brand or type of computer. The opponent might also assert that
the controls over error were insufficient and seek to destroy any guaran-
tee of trustworthiness.
Qualifying the "software" is equally essential; the witness supporting
introduction of the records should explain the programming methods
used53 since the program furnishes the computer with its instructions.
The opponent may attempt to show that the program was inadequate
to make an accurate record. The opponent should be allowed to examine
the program and present his own expert witness to challenge the pro-
gram's reliability.
When computerized information is used at trial, normally it is a
print-out from data fed earlier into the computer. The objection has
arisen that the computer record was prepared for the litigation and
hence is not to be trusted.54 This argument is, of course, specious; the
focal point of inquiry should be the initial making of the record rather
than its appearance in printed form for trial.55
Both the Model Act and Uniform Act require the business entry to
be made at or near the time of the event or transaction recorded.5" A
business record made years after the transaction or event that it seeks to
prove does not qualify for admission.57 The date of an entry in an
account book can usually be determined by its relationship to other entries.
In dealing with a computer, however, it is not usually possible to fix
the date of the input of data. Such information would be available only
in those rare cases in which the source of the input was saved, stored, and
dated or the date of entry was entered with the other data fed into the
computer. To require proof of the time between the transaction or event
and the time of the computer input would be unrealistic. The business
must still prove that the inputs were made as a part of its day-to-day
operations58 before computer records are admissible. Statutes based on
the Model Act and Uniform Act should be amended or interpreted
to allow the introduction as business records of undated and non-time
sequenced computer data. If a business has switched from conventional
to computer recordkeeping, its print-outs should be admissible even if
" Id. "Faulty programming is [a] frequent source of inaccurate output." Freed,
supra note 2, § 15, at 298.
5 4See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 260, 132 N.W.2d 871, 875 (1965).
See notes 15 & 16 supra.
Fuller v. White, 33 Cal. 2d 236, 201 P.2d 16 (1948).
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1943).
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some time has elapsed between the transaction and its recordation by
computer. Businesses should not be penalized for automating and
modernizing their operations.
The authentication of computer data may also present a problem.
Clearly a business record must be identified and authenticated by a proper
witness for the proponent of its introduction."' If data stored in the
computer is printed out without any processing by the arithmetical unit,
no serious authentication problem normally will arise. In such a situation,
the authentication requirements are the same as are required in cases
involving conventional business records. The only additional factor is the
qualification of the computer system as being reliable in reproducing the
record.
More serious authentication problems arise when the computer's
arithmetical function alters the stored input data. The witness may then
be required to reconcile the accuracy of the original stored data with the
processed figures shown on the computer business record. 0 Normally
authentication is a simple task, but cases may arise when it is virtually
impossible. The computer can process data at speeds much faster than a
man can perform the same operation. Computers also deal more accurately
with complicated formulas. It could take hours of testimony to authenti-
cate computer data in some cases. If the accuracy of the system and
procedures used to make the record have been established to the trial
judge's satisfaction, he should be given the discretion to dispense with
authentication of the processed data.
Despite the general reliability of computer business records, in certain
controversies there is a need for independent evidence not produced by
computer of the underlying transaction. The following is an example.
Customer A receives from a large department store B a bill for one-
thousand dollars for goods allegedly purchased on a certain date. B offers
its computer record as evidence of the purchase along with an unsigned
computer input card impressed with A's name and account number.
It is apparent that A is in a very poor position to defend himself and that
B very easily could have fabricated the unsigned input card. A should
be protected from such possible fabrication by the court's requiring non-
computer-produced evidence of the original transaction by B with A.
" Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 35, 125 S.E.2d 326, 329
(1962).




Once the purchase is established, subsequent payments may properly be
proved solely by computer records. A's cancelled checks or cash receipts
should offer him sufficient protection in contesting the amount of pay-
ments. But there is a real need for protecting the consumer by requiring
independent evidence of the sale because a reasonable businessman would
make an independent record of the transaction that would bear the cus-
tomer's signature.
The decisions in King and Transport show that computer records can
and will be admitted into evidence as routinely as conventional business
records have been in the past. But as fewer "conventional" records remain
in use to support the computer's product, courts will have to be more dili-
gent in examining whether the computer business record is satisfactorily
qualified and authenticated for admission. The impersonal and automatic
computer, which is the servant of the businessman, must also be the
servant of justice and not the master of men and their laws.
NORMAN E. SMITH
Federal Estate Taxation-Application of the Reciprocal Trusts
Doctrine Under the New Objective Standard
A typical reciprocal or crossed trusts situation occurs when A sets
up an irrevocable trust to pay B the income for life, remainder to C, and
B does likewise for the benefit of A for life with the remainder to C (or
D). In the usual situation A and B are members of the same family. At
one time it was thought that such an arrangement would avoid taxation
under the retained-interest rule of section 811(c) (1) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939-now section 2036 of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code. These sections provide that certain transferred property in which
the decedent has retained a life interest is to be included in his gross
estate. The general purpose underlying both sections is to insure taxation
of transfers that are essentially testamentary-that is, transfers in which
the transferor retained a significant interest or control over property trans-
ferred during his lifetime.
But the reciprocal trusts doctrine, which was advanced in Lehman v.
Commissioner,1 dissolved the belief that creation of reciprocal trusts held
the answers to successful evasion of estate taxes.' Though the reciprocal
± 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940).For a complete history of the development of the reciprocal trusts doctrine
1970]
